Evaluating Historical Episodes using Shock Decompositions in the DSGE Model by Aligishiev, Z. et al.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Aligishiev, Z., Ben-Gad, M. ORCID: 0000-0001-8641-4199 and Pearlman, J. 
(2020). Evaluating Historical Episodes using Shock Decompositions in the DSGE Model 
(20/10). London, UK: Department of Economics, City University of London. 
This is the published version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/24111/
Link to published version: 20/10
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
  
 
Department of Economics 
 
Evaluating Historical Episodes using Shock 
Decompositions in the DSGE Model  
 
Zamid Aligishiev 
City, University of London 
 
Michael Ben-Gad 
City, University of London 
 
Joseph Pearlman1 
City, University of London 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of Economics 
Discussion Paper Series 
No. 20/10 
  
 
1 Corresponding author: Department of Economics, City, University of London, Northampton Square, London EC1V 0HB, UK. E-mail: 
Joseph.Pearlman.1@city.ac.uk 
 
 
Evaluating Historical Episodes using Shock
Decompositions in the DSGE Model ∗
Zamid Aligishiev, Michael Ben-Gad and Joseph Pearlman
City, University of London
April 21, 2020
Abstract
We present alternative methods for calculating and interpreting the influence of exoge-
nous shocks on historical episodes within the context of DSGE models. We show analytically
why different methods for calculating shock decompositions can generate conflicting inter-
pretations of the same historical episodes. We illustrate this point using an extended version
of Drautzburg and Uhlig’s (2015) model of the U.S. economy, focusing on the periods 1964–
1966, 1979–1987, 2007–2008 and 2016–2018. We argue that the best method for analyzing
particular episodes is one which isolates the influence of the shocks during the period under
consideration and where the initial conditions represent the system’s distance from steady
state at the beginning of the episode.
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1 Introduction
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models estimated using Bayesian techniques
are now a standard framework for analyzing the behavior and evolution of macroeconomies. In
reduced form these are state space models where the evolution of each variable over the entire
sample period can be represented as the combined effects of the different exogenous shocks over
time.1 In this paper we describe alternative methods for calculating shock decompositions for
historical subsamples. We argue there is one that is particularly suited for this purpose but
which surprisingly has rarely been employed by the DSGE literature. This preferred method
isolates the contribution of each shock solely within the subsample. As a result, the initial
conditions in this decomposition represent the distance of the system from the steady state.
The subsequent evolution within the subsample expresses the convergence of the system from
the beginning of the episode isolated from contemporaneous shocks.
Two common approaches are applied in the DSGE literature to analyze historical episodes
using shock decompositions. One is to simply present a subsample of the historical decomposi-
tion for the entire sample, as in Del Negro et al. (2013) or Brzoza-Brzezina and Kolasa (2013).
An issue with this approach is that it does not separate the impact of the shocks of interest
during a particular time span from the impact of those that preceded them. Due to the recursive
nature of DSGE models, the impacts of these previously occurring shocks can be considerable.
An alternative approach employed, by e.g. Drautzburg and Uhlig (2015) - henceforth DU, is
to calculate the change in the entire sample decomposition from a particular start date. As
we demonstrate below, although this differencing procedure nets out the levels of the variables
from an initial starting point of interest, it does not completely isolate the decomposition from
the impact of prior shocks, which may be persistent; the persistence of even relatively minor
disaggregated shocks during a few previous periods can skew the interpretation of individual
episodes quite significantly. A third shock decomposition method is to isolate the effects of
shocks within that time span from those of shocks that occurred earlier. This approach has a
direct correspondence with the state space form of the model and so is a natural one to em-
ploy; but it has neverthless been overlooked by the literature. The purpose of this paper is to
correct this oversight.2 We demonstrate how interpretations of a particular episode can differ
depending on the shock decomposition chosen by applying all three versions to an updated and
extended version of DU’s (2015) model, which we describe below.
Why does this matter? We think this is important for two reasons. The first is the centrality
of responses of agents and government to innovations in the DSGE framework. When looking
at a model’s explanation of a particular episode it is therefore the effect of innovations in that
episode that should be highlighted. If one believes that monetary policy was unexpectedly tight
during, e.g., the term of U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, then one should look at
the effects of the contemporaneous monetary policy shocks in order to analyze the effects of
1The literature is a very large one, but Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters
(2003, 2007) are widely regarded as seminal contributions.
2A possible explanation for why this is almost never applied in the literature is that thus far there is no
Dynare facility for this.
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monetary policy in this period. Secondly, one could also view the empirical analysis as a way
of identifying when and where the model is a good approximation to the data (and where it
is not). Large shocks in the estimated model without historical corroboration, or the absence
of large shocks when history points to their existence, may be seen as evidence that the model
needs to be amended to better account for these episodes. This is the way the literature has
evolved, so that, e.g. DU adapt the Smets and Wouters (2007) model by including additional
wedges between the policy rate and private and government borrowing rates in order to fit
the model to the data for the 2007-2008 financial crisis episode. To assess the need for and
explanatory power of these adaptations in the 2007-2008 crisis period, one needs to isolate the
shocks to these wedges during this period. This is what the third shock decomposition approach
described in this paper does.
We describe the role of shocks in the context of the reduced-form state space representation
of DSGE models in Section 2. We then present our suggested method for isolating the impact
of exogenous shocks for a particular period alongside the two alternatives mentioned above. In
Section 3 we briefly present our extended version of DU’s (2015) DSGE model, which we use
to illustrate the differing interpretations of particular recent episodes in U.S. macroeconomic
history. We chose the DU model as it is built on the seminal Smets and Wouters (2007) model,
but expanded to include a role for fiscal policy and financial frictions. These are important
features of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, which is one of the historical subperiods we focus on
below. Our model also allows government investment to generate a degree of increasing returns.
In Section 4 we show how the different methods for calculating shock decompositions can
generate very different interpretations of the same historical episodes. We first consider the
period of relatively high growth from 1964Q2 to 1966Q1. Whereas two of the decompositions
suggest fiscal policy played an important role in raising output, perhaps associated with im-
plementation of President Johnson’s tax cuts at the beginning of this period, our preferred
decomposition suggests that much of the good performance of the US economy during this
period can be attributed to the legacy of shocks from previous quarters.
Similarly, we analyze the period surrounding the financial crisis, from 2006Q4 to 2009Q3.
According to the most commonly used decomposition, the year preceding the crisis could be
characterized as a time of relative stability, where the benefits of expansionary monetary pol-
icy and positive shocks to both government and private investment were partly offset by the
downward pressure asserted by intermediate-term interest rates and the shocks to total factor
productivity and preferences. From 2007Q4 onwards we see a subtle but growing imbalance
between these forces that from one quarter to the next tips the economy further and further into
recession. An alternative decomposition interprets the financial crisis as largely driven by neg-
ative preference shocks combined with an intensification of previous negative shocks to private
investment. According to this decomposition, the turmoil in the financial markets that char-
acterized this period, i.e. the observed rise in both corporate bond and term spread, had only
a muted effect on output. Furthermore, neither the conventional nor unconventional elements
of monetary policy implemented by the US Federal Reserve appear to have had much of an
ameliorating effect. By contrast, our preferred decomposition assigns a far more important role
to interest rate spreads in explaining the evolution of the crisis. This decomposition also clearly
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identifies the extraordinary countercyclical fiscal and monetary policies implemented during the
crisis as shocks to the ordinary evolution of government expenditure and the estimated Taylor
rule.
We also consider the behavior of the economy during the period corresponding to the last
three years of the data set, from 2016Q2 to 2019Q1. According to our preferred decomposition,
private investment and price markups had an increasingly negative effect on output, but these
shocks are offset by the positive impact of initial conditions reflecting the economy’s ongoing
post-crisis convergence to steady state. There is also evidence of an expansionary role for fiscal
policy, but little effect from monetary policy throughout. By contrast, the most commonly used
decomposition suggests that monetary policy initially plays a positive but diminishing role, while
another suggests that monetary policy exerts ever-increasing downward pressure on output.
They each assign important, though opposing, roles for the intermediate-term bond spread over
the policy rate. We explain how these counterintuitive and often contradictory interpretations
arise from the particular shock decomposition formula used to analyze the same estimated
shocks from our model. However, not always do the different decomposition methods yield
such divergent interpretations. We examine the period from 1979 to 1987, which corresponds
to the eight years that Paul Volcker served as Chairman of the US Federal Reserve. All three
methods highlight both the profound negative impact of the contractionary monetary policy
Volcker implemented during his term and the positive impact of shocks to private investment
during the mid 1980’s.
In Section 5 we describe the data extensions and resultant changes to variance and historical
decompositions of the DU model used in Section 4. We think the model is of interest in itself as
it provides an interesting account of the evolution of the US macroeconomy and the influence
of monetary and fiscal policy over the period 1948-2019. The model extends the DU analysis
to include twelve data series and twelve exogenous shocks. The additional data series are the
interest rates for intermediate-term and long-term government debt, which are added to the
policy rate and short-term corporate bond rate that were included in the original DU paper.
Thus the extended model has four interest rates, all determined by data. This is important
addition, as these interest rates do not move together during the periods of interest, and not
including them generates counterfactual responses in the model. The inclusion of two additional
observed variables necessitates the inclusion of additional exogenous shocks, one of which we
choose to be a preference shock. Secondly we update and enhance the data used in the model.
We improve the measure of public debt so that it comprises net, rather than gross, federal
debt, and also state and local debt, and we extend our sample period to the first quarter of
2019. Since the policy rate controlled by the Federal Reserve reached the effective zero bound
during the financial crisis and its aftermath, we incorporate the shadow rate calculated by Wu
and Xia (2016) during this period in our estimation. We demonstrate by means of variance
decomposition and historical shock decomposition for the period 1948-2019 the effect of our
modifications to the model. With regard to the decompositions, we find that the inclusion of
a preference shock plays a significant role in our model, with large preference shocks having
negative impacts on consumption in the third quarter of 2001, coinciding with the events of
9/11, and in the last two quarters of 2008, coinciding with collapse of Lehman Brothers. The
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estimated model also provides an intuitive picture of the evolution of the U.S. economy during
the seven decades following World War II, and in particular highlights the impact of the Federal
Reserve’s tight monetary policy during the 1980s and early 1990s.
2 Decomposition
The model is solved as a log-linear first order approximation around the steady state which has
the form
St = ASt−1 +Bet (1)
Xt = CSt (2)
where St is a vector of M state variables, Xt a vector of N observables, and et a vector
of exogenous shocks of dimension equal to or greater than N . Matrices A, B and C are
appropriately dimensioned. Iterating the state equation forward means that at any point t:
Xt = CA
tS0 +
t∑
j=1
CAt−jBej . (3)
One can use this equation for any period to decompose the deviation of a variable from its
balanced growth path into the contribution from each exogenous shock and the initial condition.
For a stable equilibrium, At should tend to zero as t becomes larger, and so at the end of the
sample almost all the variation in variables is explained by the exogenous shocks.
When examining the shock decomposition over a historical period from t + 1 to t + h, an
obvious procedure is to subsume both the initial condition S0 and all shocks prior to t+ 1 into
a new term that represents the state of the economy at time t, St, and to treat only subsequent
shocks within the shock decomposition:
Xt+h = CA
hSt +
t+h∑
j=t+1
CAt+h−jBej , h ∈ {1, ..., k} . (4)
This decomposition (DC1) isolates shocks occurring after time t, the second term, from
those that occurred in previous periods. The first term captures the initial condition at the
start of the episode and represents how distant the variable of interest is at that moment from
its balanced growth path value. The value of this term in the ensuing periods captures how
much the evolution of the variable is attributable to the convergence properties of the model,
rather than the contribution of the subsequent shocks.3
The most common procedure, however, is to obtain the smoothed shocks for the entire
sample, and then extract the shock decomposition for the period being analyzed.4 This is
the approach adopted by Brzoza-Brzezina and Kolasa (2013), who use quarterly US data from
1970 to 2010 to estimate three different models, and then compare the shock decompositions
from those models starting in 2000. This is also the approach in Del Negro et al. (2013), who
3We have programmed a general code in Matlab for calculating this shock decomposition that can be imple-
mented for a model estimated using Dynare 4.5.7, available upon request.
4In the software package Dynare, the shock decomposition command generates this.
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estimate a model from 1984Q1 to 2013Q1, and then evaluate the shock decomposition from
2007. Starting from date t+ 1 continuing through date t+ k, we can use (3) to generate
Xt+h = CA
t+hS0 +
t∑
j=1
CAt+h−jBej +
t+h∑
j=t+1
CAt+h−jBej , h ∈ {1, ..., k} . (5)
The first two terms of this expression are incorporated into CAhSt in (4), representing the initial
values up to the start of the episode. However the shock decomposition (DC2) of the authors
above, and currently in Dynare 4.5.7, uses the last two terms, with the first term representing
the effect of the initial values. Thus, shock decompositions calculated this way place significant
weight on the impacts of shocks that occurred before the event, and as the effects of these
shocks can be highly persistent, the interpretation of any episode may be highly influenced by
events that happened years earlier.5
One possible way to correct for the influence in DC2 of much earlier shocks is to examine
the difference in shock decompositions before and after an event that occurred from period t
through t+ h:
Xt+h−Xt = C(At+h−At)S0 +
t∑
j=1
CAt−j(Ah− I)Bej +
t+h∑
j=t+1
CAt+h−jBej , h ∈ {1, ..., k} . (6)
This is the approach (DC3) taken by DU, who estimate their model of the U.S. economy from
1948 to 2018 and present their decomposition of output for the last four quarters in the sample
to evaluate the cause of the financial crisis. The first term once again does not represent the
state of the economy at time t, only whatever effects remain from the initial conditions at the
beginning of the sample; the second two terms then provide the shock decomposition. Thus,
while differencing nets out the initial value of the variables, it does nothing to reduce the impact
of the previous shocks on the net changes. This is because the shock decomposition comprises
not merely the last term in (6), but the second-to-last term as well, and that still incorporates
the influence of prior shocks from the very initial period onwards.
3 The Model
We demonstrate how the different methods of shock decomposition can yield starkly different
interpretations of historical subperiods by applying all three methods of shock decomposition
to shocks generated by a medium-sized DSGE model—our updated and extended version of
DU, which is itself built on the seminal Smets and Wouters (2007), but expanded to include a
role for fiscal policy and financial frictions. We describe the model briefly below and the data
extensions in section 5.
DU estimate a model of the U.S. economy for the period between 1948 and 2008 which
includes three separate interest rates: the intermediate-term rate at which the government
5Despite a (non-exhaustive, admittedly) trawl of the literature, we have found no recently published papers
that use DC1 rather than DC2. Anzoategui et al. (2019) do use this decomposition in a nonlinear model that
takes account of the zero lower bound, but given the nonlinearity, they ignore initial effects. We have it on good
authority, though, that most prominent central banks use DC1 when analyzing historical shock decompositions.
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Figure 1: The relationship between the different interest rates and corresponding wedges in
the model. Red circles designate the observed time series used to estimate the model in (a)
Drautzburg and Uhlig (2015) and (b) this paper.
borrows, rb; the corresponding rate for private firms, rk; and the policy rate determined by the
Federal Reserve, rf . These interest rates implicitly define three corresponding wedges between
each of the three pairs as depicted in Figure 1. We improve a little on their model. Specifically,
DU’s estimation only includes two data series for these interest rate variables: data for rf ,
along with the wedge ωb, representing the difference between rb and rk. This means that while
the distance between rb and rk is determined by the data, the levels of these two variables are
determined within the model, along with the other two wedges (see Figure 1).
We introduce an additional interest rate, rl, on long-term government bonds, which creates
an additional wedge that allows us to isolate financial frictions from differences stemming from
shifts in the yield curve.6 Hence our model includes four interest rates and four corresponding
wedges, all determined by data: ωf represents the wedge between the policy rate rf , which is
also an overnight interest rate and the five-year interest rate at which the U.S. government does
most of its borrowing; ωb represents the difference between the yields on five-year and twenty-
year government bonds; and ωl is the yield spread between twenty-year government bonds and
twenty-year corporate bonds. The wedge ωl represents the sort of financial frictions associated
with recessions, isolated from the behavior of the yield curve represented by both ωf and ωb.
These three wedges together sum to the wedge ωk.
The inclusion of two additional data series necessitates the inclusion of additional shocks to
provide sufficient degrees of freedom for the estimation. We follow Justiniano, Primiceri and
Tambalotti (2011) and add a preference shock, which they show has significant explanatory
power for consumption movements in post-war U.S. data. Including this preference shock has
the benefit of incorporating unmodeled effects on consumer demand, such as the impact from
the start of the financial crisis of the drop in house prices (Mian and Sufi, 2018). We model the
preference shock in a standard way, following Linde´ and Trabandt (2018), as a multiplicative
shock, ςp, to the discount factor, β, so that optimizing agent j’s utility function with an external
habit is represented by
U = E
[ ∞∑
s=0
ςsp,tβ
s 1
1− σ (Ct+s(j)− hCt+s−1)
1−σ exp(
σ − 1
1 + ν
nt+s(j)
1+ν)
]
6DU use the series provided by FRED that represents the wedge between corporate bonds with “maturities
20 years and above” and the 10 year treasury bond.
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where
log ςp,t = ρP log ςp,t−1 + εp,t, εp,t ∼ N(0, σ2εp)
and Ct(j) is time t consumption of optimizing agent j, Ct is the time t aggregate consumption
across all optimizing agents, and nt(j) represents the optimizing agent’s time t labor supply.
The preference shocks only enter the Euler equation; the effect of a positive preference shock is
to effectively increase the discount factor, which results in higher savings and less consumption
in line with intuition.
Intermediate goods are produced by firms using a Cobb-Douglas technology that combines
effective private capital, which is the stock Kpt (i) produced in the prior period multiplied by
a capital utilization term ut (i), and effective labor, the input supplied by households nt (i)
multiplied by trend growth µt. Production is also subject to a fixed cost Φ, and and an external
effect generated by the contemporaneous stock of government capital Kgt :
Yt (i) = ˜
a
t
 (K
g
t )
Λ
1∫
0
Yt (j) dj + Φµt

ζ
1−ζ
(ut (i)K
p
t (i))
α
(
µtnt (i)
)1−α − Φµt (7)
Aggregating firm-level output using Yt =
1∫
0
Yt (i) di+ Φµ
t yields
Yt = ˜
a
t (K
g
t )
ζΛ
(utK
p
t )
α(1−ζ) (
µtnt
)(1−ζ)(1−α) − Φµt. (8)
The production functions (7) and (8) differ from DU in only one respect: by including the
exponent Λ as an estimated parameter, we permit government capital to potentially generate
nonconstant returns to scale for the aggregate economy. Marginal costs for firms are now
MCt = α
−α (1− α)−(1−α)
W 1−αt
(
Rkt
)α
µ−(1−α)t(
(Kgt−1)
Λ
Yt+µtΦ
) ζ
1−ζ
αt
, (9)
which in turn enters firms’ first order conditions, determining the demand for capital and labor,
and also enters the equations that determine the price of final goods and the profits remitted to
households. As in DU, households supply differentiated labor to unions, which sell it to labor
packers. Calvo pricing obtains in both the goods and labor markets, and when unions have
the opportunity to adjust wages, they set them to maximize the welfare of a representative
household.7
3.1 Estimation and Historical Decomposition 1948–2019
The model is estimated using Dynare.8 The priors and posteriors of the model’s parameters
are set out in Tables 2 and 3. In this section we consider how our augmented version of the
7This matches the code for the estimated model developed by DU though the article itself asserts that unions
maximise the welfare of rational optimizing households only.
8We estimate DU’s model using the code they supply (see https://ideas.repec.org/c/red/ccodes/14-44.
html). We are able to replicate their estimated model, aside from the variance decomposition, for the whole
sample period. In addition, we found a small error in the original code for the linearization of the model’s profit
equation and provide our own estimates for a corrected version of their model in Table 1.
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Figure 2: Shock decomposition 1948Q2–2019Q1, calculated using the decomposition formula
(6). The black line represents output.
DU model can be used to interpret the behavior of output across the entire time period from
1948Q2 to 2019Q1.
Table 1 displays the averages for the whole sample period; however, the relative importance
of specific shocks differs over time in interesting and significant ways. Figure 2 illustrates the
evolution of the shock decompositions over time using the shock decomposition procedure in
Dynare which corresponds to the formula in (6), where the shock decompositions in each time
period sum to the log of output relative to trend.
Figure 2 shows the following patterns: expansive monetary policy during the 1950s 60s and
70s, followed by a sharp contraction during the 1980s associated with the anti-inflationary poli-
cies instituted by Fed Chairman Paul Volcker, then succeeded by a resumption of expansionary
policy. Nevertheless, whereas in DU expansionary monetary policy plays a very significant ex-
pansionary role for the nearly three decades after WWII, but Volcker’s subsequant policy seems
to have only a modest and relatively transitory impact on output, beginning in 1981 and ending
by 1986, our model suggests monetary policy was not nearly as significant during those same
three decades, but its contractionary impact began as early as 1979 and continued till 1992,
corresponding with the end of the Bush administration.
Throughout much of the last half of the twentieth century the influence of preference shocks
in Figure 2 is typically positive, but it turns decidedly negative in the third quarter of 2001
and remains negative thereafter, suggesting a long-lasting decline in the value of ςp,t beginning
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in the third quarter of 2001 (coinciding with the events of 9/11), intensifying during most of
2003 (the U.S. invasion of Iraq), and then gradually dissipating by the end of 2005. A new
sharp decline appears in the last two quarters of 2008, coinciding with the first and second bail
outs of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in July and September 2008 and the collapse of Lehman
Brothers, also in September 2008.9
In terms of post-war fiscal policy, note that at the beginning of 1948, nine quarters after
the end of the second world war, the U.S. debt burden was 90.2% of GDP. It declined steadily
during the nearly three decades that followed, reaching a low point of 33.3% in the last quarter
of 1974. From then the debt burden rose—first gradually, reaching 39.2% in the first quarter of
1978 before slightly receding, and then increasing again at an accelerated pace from the fourth
quarter of 1981, coinciding with the enactment of the first phase of the Economic Recovery Tax
Act on October 1 of that year, until the second quarter of 1995, when it reached 68.5%.10 Having
declined during the subsequent period to 53.7% of GDP in the second quarter of 2001, the debt
burden began to rise rapidly following the events of September 2001 and again accelerated
rapidly after the first quarter of 2008.
The impact of this history on output is expressed directly through the labor tax and in-
directly through the government bond spread. If we first divide the entire sample period into
three parts, we can see in Figure 2 that the impact of the labor tax initially fluctuates around
zero during the period till mid-1957, when the debt was mostly falling but always above 60%
of GDP. In the years that follow, as the debt burden continues to decline, labor taxes no longer
need adjust to stabilize the debt, and so their impact on output is nearly always positive. This
still remains the case during the 1990s when the debt burden begins and ends the decade at
60% of GDP, but temporarily reaches a peak of 70% in the last quarter of 1993. From 2007 the
debt burden once more breaches the 60% threshold, and the impact of the labor tax fluctuates
around zero. After that, from the beginning of 2011 when the debt burden reaches close to
90%, to the end of the sample in 2019Q1, the impact of labour taxation is uniformly negative
(save for one quarter, 2015Q4, when it is slightly positive).
Similarly, the combined effect on output of the 5-year and 20-year government bonds fluc-
tuates around zero until the second quarter of 1983. Thereafter the impact is always negative,
coinciding with the general rise in the debt burden and, perhaps as a consequence, the higher
spreads relative to the policy rate. The spread between the interest rate on the 5-year govern-
ment bond and the policy interest rate fluctuates, but is only zero or negative for sustained
periods between 1968Q2 and 1981Q3, when debt hovered between 33% and 40%. By contrast,
only in 2010 and after, as the debt climbs above 80% of GDP, does the spread ever exceed
seventy basis points.
9We find the preference shocks, but not the other shocks, are negatively correlated with the cyclically adjusted
price earnings ratio calculated by Robert Shiller, http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data/ie_data.xls.
This suggests that investors bid up the price of equities, relative to earnings, in response to a rise in the willingness
to defer consumption and save.
10Congress passed the legislation on August 4, 1981, and President Ronald Reagan signed it into law on August
13, 1981.
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4 Comparing Alternative Shock Decompositions
We compare the alternative shock decompositions by discussing the model’s explanation of key
episodes in U.S. macroeconomic history, which we argue provides a generally intuitive picture
of the evolution of the U.S. economy during the seven decades following World War II. The
model highlights the impact of the Federal Reserve’s tight monetary policy during the 1980s
and early 1990s and, compared to DU, ascribes a far more important role for bond spreads,
particularly the part of the yield curve associated with intermediate-term maturities. This effect
is particularly pronounced from the late 1980s onwards, and intensifies still further during the
financial crisis.
To understand how the three different methods (4)–(6) for calculating shock decompositions
in Section 2 can generate profoundly different interpretations of particular historical episodes,
we first isolate the instantaneous impact of the values of the shock process itself represented
by the term CBej in (3), on output for every quarter during two different three decade long
periods, between 1957Q4 and 1987Q3 in Figure 3a and between 19899Q2 and 2019Q1 in Figure
3b.
In Figure 3 the preference shocks, along with shocks to the labor tax and private investment,
and to a lesser extent government spending and technology, appear to dominate throughout both
the subsamples. Still, across the different time periods, differences in the patterns of shocks
do emerge. Monetary policy shocks in Figure 3a were more amplified (and mostly negative)
during the late 1970s and early 1980s, but much more muted during the prior and subsequent
periods. The shocks to private investment in Figure 3b become notably more muted starting
from the early twenty-first century. How do these patterns express themselves when fed through
the three different shock decompositions formulae (4)–(6)? We focus primarily on (4) and (5)
for the three episodes and then discuss the decomposition (6).
Consider the two-year period of rapid above trend U.S. growth from the second quarter
of 1964—the period that followed the signing into law of the Tax Reduction Act of 1964 by
President Johnson. In Figure 4a we apply our preferred shock decomposition (4) to output
during this period, where the vector of shocks for 1964Q2 corresponds to the shocks for the
same quarter in Figure 3a. Throughout this period the implication of this decomposition is
that both the corresponding shocks to private investment and labor taxation we observe in
Figure 3a exert downward pressure on output, partly mitigated by a variety of other shocks,
but particularly the price markup and government investment. However, this decomposition
method demonstrates that in this instance, most of the divergence of output from its steady
state is the cumulative effect of the previous shocks to that date, which are far more important
than the shocks which occurred during the relevant period. We contrast these conclusions with
those that might be drawn from the shock decompositions generated using (5) and (6) in Figures
4b and 4c.
According to the standard decomposition (5) used to generate the results in Figure 4b the
largest contribution to the expansion starting from 1964Q4 is the reduction in price markups,
with far smaller roles for technology, labor taxes, government investment, and the interest rates
on corporate and 20-year government bonds, along with the preference shock. Mitigating these
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effects are the negative effects generated by shocks to private investment and 5-year government
bonds.
The reason the shock decomposition in Figure 4b seems so disconnected from the pattern
of underlying shocks in Figure 3a for the corresponding period stems from the way the formula
in (5) conflates the impact of the shocks occurring in the time period with those occurring
beforehand. Hence, although the influence of the preference shocks and shocks to the labor tax
appear to have the greatest impact on output in Figure 3a across the entire span of ten years, the
manner in which they fluctuate between positive and negative values prior to 1964 means that
when aggregating their cumulative effect they largely cancel each other out, which mitigates
their influence on output in the periods that follow as measured by (5). By contrast, smaller
shocks to government investment are mostly positive and shocks to the interest rate on 5-year
government bonds largely negative in the periods prior to 1964Q2, and it is this consistency
that ultimately inflates their perceived cumulative impact on the evolution of output from
1964Q2 onwards. Finally, note that this decomposition merely isolates a sub-period of the
decomposition in Figure 2, and so the legacy of the initial conditions from the beginning of the
sample in 1948 have nearly all dissipated by 1964. This type of shock decomposition tells us
nothing about where the economy is in 1964Q2 relative to steady state.
That distinction is particularly important when we consider the immediate run-up to the
financial crisis. Figure 5a demonstrates that according to the model, output in the last quarter
of 2006 was well above its steady-state level, and that much of its subsequent decline can be
attributed to convergence. By the first quarter of 2008, in addition to convergence, a set of
very small shocks appears to exert negative pressure on the economy, offsetting the positive
effects of expansionary monetary policy, shocks to the labor tax, and smaller contributions
from government investment and the preference shock. From the third quarter of that year,
as the recession intensified, some of the decline in output can be ascribed to the accumulating
impacts of the shocks to preferences, and from the next quarter the shock to private investment.
The largest effect emanates from the shocks to three of the model’s four interest rates (one on
corporate bonds, rk, and two on government bonds, rb and rl), which counteract the effect of
the positive shocks to the other interest rate that relates to monetary policy (the policy rate,
rf ). In terms of Figure 1b, all of these changes imply a large increase in ωk that we observe in
the data, which in turn is comprised of increases in ωb, ωl and ωf that we also observe.
By contrast, the standard shock decomposition in Figure 5b, obtained by using (5), suggests
rather counterintuitively that not much happened in the economy throughout the period from
2006Q4 to 2009Q3. The price markup plays a small negative role throughout the entire period,
and monetary policy and government investment are expansionary long before the crisis begins.
There is some downward pressure on output from the technology shock, but that largely dissi-
pates as the economy veers into severe recession—replaced by small negative shocks to private
investment and the interest rates on corporate bonds. Mostly what appears to generate the
crisis in 2008-2009 is the intensification of the negative shocks from the cost of government
borrowing and preferences. The picture that emerges in Figure 5a is one of growing turbulence
as the shocks amplify from early 2008 onwards, whereas Figure 5b presents a picture of an
economy that is at first finely balanced between offsetting sets of both positive and negative
12
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Figure 3: Instantaneous impact of the shock process CBej on output from (3) for 1956Q2 to
1966Q1 and 1977Q2 to 1987Q3.
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Figure 4: Shock decompositions for 1964Q2–1966Q1, calculated using the decomposition for-
mulae (4)-(6). The black line represents output in (a) and (b) and the deviation of output from
the period prior to the decomposition in (c).
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Figure 5: Shock decompositions for 2006Q4–2009Q3, calculated using the decomposition for-
mulae (4)-(6). The black line represents output in (a) and (b) and the deviation of output from
the period prior to the decomposition in (c).
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Figure 6: Shock decompositions for 2016Q2–2019Q1, calculated using the decomposition for-
mulae (4)-(6). The black line represents output in (a) and (b) and the deviation of output from
the period prior to the decomposition in (c).
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Figure 7: Shock decompositions for 1979Q3–1987Q3, calculated using the decomposition for-
mulae (4)-(6). The black line represents output in (a) and (b) and the deviation of output from
the period prior to the decomposition in (c).
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shocks and is then finally tipped into severe recession by very subtle shifts in their relative
importance.
The shocks in Figure 3b are particularly large during 2008, yet the shock decomposition
(5) once again applies large weights to events that occurred before the end of 2006. Therefore,
because the shocks to government investment prior to the episode under consideration are small
but consistently positive, and their impact sufficiently persistent, they exert a strong positive
influence on the shock decomposition in Figure 5b. Similarly, the shocks to the price markup
in the period prior to the end of 2006 are extremely small, but they have a visible impact in
Figure 5b because they are persistently negative.
A similar pattern emerges when we consider how the estimated shocks in Figure 3b are
translated into the shock decomposition in Figure 6a for the period between 2016Q2 and 2019Q1,
which corresponds to the last three years of our data. Detrended output throughout the period
is flat. Monetary policy no longer has much impact in either direction, but private investment,
price markups, the preference shocks, government spending and the interest rate on 5-year
government bonds all exert downward pressure on output. At the same time, output is bolstered
by the shocks to labor taxes and private bonds. More importantly, seven years after the end
of the great recession and following years of below-trend growth in its aftermath, the prior
accumulation of negative shocks has left output well below its steady-state value. In the period
that follows, the receding impact over time of the initial conditions in Figure 6a means that
according to our model, despite the prevalence of negative shocks, output is growing at its
trend rate because these negative shocks are counteracted by the effect of convergence. What
interpretation of this very same history would a shock decomposition that employs (5) yield?
Note that in the periods both before and after 2016, the preference shocks and shocks to
the labor tax in Figure 3b are prominent but fluctuate. By contrast, the direct impact of the
shocks to government investment are small but consistently positive before 2016Q2, but negative
in that particular quarter. However, the decomposition in Figure 6b registers a positive and
significant impact on output, because it expresses the accumulating effects from those previous
periods, carried forward. Similarly the impact of the price markup is very small in Figure 3b,
yet because it is consistently negative its cumulative influence is inflated.
One alternative to the standard decomposition, designed to isolate the impact of the shocks
within the time period of interest, is to follow DU and apply the differencing formula in (6).
Yet in practice, analysis of the shocks’ impact is still predicated on their previous behavior.
This procedure merely draws a contrast between the cumulative impact of the different shocks
up to the episode under examination and their subsequent behavior during the episode that is
analyzed. For example, the effect of the shocks to 5-year government bonds in the late 1950s
and early 1960s in Figure 3a are largely negative; they play little role in explaining the evolution
of output from 1964Q2 to 1966Q1. Nonetheless in Figure 4c their positive influence grows over
time, because their absence contrasts with their steady and mostly negative influence in the
periods prior to 1964Q2. Unlike the standard decomposition in Figure 4b, here the influence
of the price markup is much more modest, and the shocks to government investment nearly
disappear because their behavior before and after 1964Q2 is so similar—whatever role they
played is obscured by differencing.
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Depending on the pattern of the shocks, particularly prior to the period under consideration,
the differencing method (6) and our preferred decomposition method (4) can on occasion deliver
somewhat similar interpretations of a particular episode. This is the case when we consider the
period from 2006Q4 to 2009Q3 and compare Figures 5a and 5c, though the latter suggests the
negative shock to private investment played a much greater role in the crisis.
There is even greater congruence between the results of all three decomposition methods
when we analyze the period from 1979Q3 to 1987Q3, which coincided with Paul Volcker’s term
as Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve. All three decompositions in Figure 7 capture the
initial negative impact on output associated with the deflationary policies implemented during
Volcker’s term. They all suggest that the negative impact of these policies persisted throughout
much of the 1980s reinforced by the increase in government borrowing, long after the economy
recovered, which each of the decompositions suggests was largely driven by positive shocks to
private investment and to a lesser degree by declines in the price markup.
Still, applying the differencing methodology (6) can produce a shock decomposition for
the last three years in the sample in Figure 6c that diverges from the shock decompositions
in both Figures 6a and 6b. Differencing removes the negative influence of the price markup
shock and the positive influence of government investment in Figure 6b that reflects their
cumulative impact from earlier periods. At the same time, during the period from 2016Q2 to
2019Q1 the shocks to monetary policy in Figure 3b are muted. However, just as Figure 6b
reflects the positive impact of monetary policy on output from earlier in the decade rather than
contemporaneous shocks, the influence of the negative sign in the second term in (6) means
that differencing produces a pattern that is almost its mirror image in Figure 6c. Similarly,
5-year bonds and technology have positive but receding impacts on output in Figure 6b and
negative and intensifying impacts in Figure 6c. The impact of the preference shock is negative
in Figure 6b and largely positive in Figure 6c. Finally, unlike our preferred decomposition,
the differencing methodology does not demonstrate the influence of the initial conditions prior
to 2016Q2 via the convergence properties of the model and their subsequent contribution to
the evolution of output. The fact that three very different interpretations of the same episode,
using shocks generated by the same model, emerge in Figure 6 strongly suggests that when using
DSGE models to interrogate the past, the method chosen to calculate the shock decomposition
can be decisive.
5 Conclusion
The analysis of shock decompositions offers useful insights both into the workings of DSGE
models and for evaluating how the shocks in these models may help to explain particular
historical periods. Our analysis of the impact of the deflationary policies implemented by the
Federal Reserve during the 1980s demonstrates that the three different methods we compare
can on occasion yield roughly similar interpretations of a particular episode. However, as we
also demonstrate, this is not generally the case and the different methods will often generate
very different results. Our preferred method is the one that is designed to isolate the impact of
shocks within the episode being analyzed from the impact of previous shocks.
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Appendix
A: An Extended Drautzburg-Uhlig Model of the U.S. Economy
1948-2018
In this section we describe more fully the extended version of the DU model used in Section
4. We first describe the enhanced data set used in the model and then demonstrate, by means
of variance decomposition, the effect of our modifications to the model. In particular, in DU
the wage markup exerts an important negative effect on output during much of the 1970’s and
1980s, and then an equally large positive effect from the late 1990s till the end of the sample;
in our extended version its impact is much smaller.
A1: Modifications to the Data Compared with DU
Of the twelve data series used in our estimation, eight are the same as those found in DU,
starting in 1948Q2, but are updated and extended to cover the additional forty one quarters
from 2009Q1 to 2019Q1. These are (1) output: chained 2005 real GDP, growth rates; (2)
consumption: private consumption expenditure, growth rates; (3) investment: private fixed
investment, growth rates; (4) government investment, growth rates; (5) hours worked: civilian
employment index × average nonfarm business weekly hours worked index, demeaned log; (6)
inflation: GDP deflator, quarterly growth rates; (7) wages: nonfarm business, hourly compen-
sation index, growth rates; and (8) policy interest rate: from March 1948 to June 1954 we
use the 3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate, from January 2009 through November
2015 the shadow rate calculated by Wu and Xia (2016), and for all other months the Federal
Funds Rate, all coverted to quarterly rates. The remaining four are as described in this sec-
tion: (9) corporate bond yield: Moody’s Baa index at quarterly rates; (10) net public debt
(described below), demeaned log; (11) 5-year U.S. Treasury coupon note yield supplemented
by data calculated by Ibbotson (2016) on intermediate-term U.S. Treasury bond yields for the
period between 1948Q2 and 1953Q1; and (12) 20-year U.S. Treasury coupon note yields sup-
plemented by data calculated by Ibbotson (2016) on long-term U.S. Treasury bond yields for
the period from 1948Q2 to 1953Q1 and 1987Q1 to 1993Q3.
To highlight the importance of including data on government bond yields directly in the
model, we plot in Figure 8 this data series alongside the implied interest rate on government
debt that is generated by DU’s original model and using their data. This shows that in DU, the
interest rate on government bonds plays a significant role in equilibrating the model, causing
it to descend below the zero lower bound on several occasions across the sample period and
inducing a counterfactual degree of volatility not observed in the data. Note that the volatility
is particularly elevated during the last two quarters of 2008, a phenomenon not observed in the
data.
Aside from including the additional time series, the specific choice of 5-year Treasury bonds
over the 10-year bonds better matches the maturity structure of U.S. government debt (see
Greenwood et al. (2015) and Blanchard (2019)). Another benefit of this approach is that while
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Figure 8: Interest Rates data used in estimating the model in this paper. Green: Policy Rate, March
1948 to June 1954 3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate, January 2009 through November 2015
shadow rate calculated by Wu and Xia (2016), and for all other months the Federal Funds Rate, coverted
to quarterly rates. Red: 5-year U.S. Treasury coupon note yield 1953Q2 to 2019Q1, supplemented by data
calculated by Ibbotson (2016) on intermediate-term U.S. Treasury bond yields for the period between
1948Q2 to 1953Q1. Blue: 20-year U.S. Treasury coupon note yields supplemented by data calculated
by Ibbotson (2016) on long-term U.S. Treasury bond yields for the period from 1948Q2 to 1953Q1 and
1987Q1 to 1993Q3. Brown: Corporate bond yield, Moody’s Baa index at quarterly rates. Grey columns:
the cost of government borrowing that equilibriates Drautzburg and Uhlig’s (2015) model for 1948Q2 to
2008Q4.
the yield on corporate bonds is available at monthly frequencies for the entire sample period,
the yields on both 10-year Treasury bonds and the corresponding spread used by DU are only
available from April 1954.11 The interest rates intermediate-term (5-year) U.S. Treasury coupon
notes are also unavailable till April 1954, so we augment the series for the missing periods with
the intermediate-term (5-year) interest rates calculated by Ibbotson (2016).
In addition to the interest rate on government borrowing, we also introduce an alternative
measure of the public debt itself, derived as the sum of federal government debt securities and the
total liabilities of state and local governments, excluding employee retirement funds (the series
FL314122005.Q and FL214090005.Q in the Financial Accounts of the United States, published
by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). Unlike the gross federal debt series
at par value calculated by the Dallas Federal Reserve and used by DU, our measure of public
debt excludes intergovernmental federal debt (particularly nonmarketable debt held by the
Social Security Trust Fund), but includes the net public liabilities of states and localities. This
11When estimating their model, DU assume the spread is zero from 1948 through 1953.
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Figure 9: Public debt series in Drautzburg and Uhlig (2015) and in this paper divided by
nominal GDP (left axis) and the difference between them (right axis).
better matches the way debt is characterized in the model’s government budget constraint.12
The difference between our data series and the original data series used by DU is depicted in
Figure 9 in the Appendix. Though the two series mostly move in tandem, their series begins
and ends the sample period approximately 5% of GDP above the series we constructed. During
the intervening years the two series mostly diverge in the other direction—our series exceeds
theirs by over 12% of GDP during the late 1980s. Perhaps most notably, during the period of
the financial crisis, their series implies that the debt burden rose by 7.4% in the last quarter of
2008, whereas our series implies a more modest increase of 4.7%.
A2: Resulting Differences in Variance and Shock Decompostion
Table 1 compares the historical variance decomposition for both DU’s model and our extended
model. Not surprisingly the addition of the eleventh and twelfth shocks detracts from the
importance of most of the original ten. Of the three large shocks in DU – monetary policy,
technology and private investment, which together account for nearly 60% of the variance—only
the contribution of monetary policy remains nearly undiminished. The price markup, labor tax,
government spending, and government investment all recede in importance. The wage markup
nearly disappears entirely. More importantly, once we add the two yields on government bonds
as additional observable variables, the shock associated with the spread between policy rate and
12The model does not distinguish between the different levels of government or the different tax rates they
impose. At the same time, a dollar of tax collected on earnings either through income tax or the Federal Insurance
Contributions Act (FICA) has the same impact on net federal debt (our measure), but if collected through FICA
actually increases the stock of gross debt.
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Table 1: Variance decomposition for this paper versus Drautzburg and Uhlig’s model.
†Drautzburg and Uhlig’s (2015) model 1948Q2 to 2008Q4, with small correction to code.
Shocks Drautzburg This
and Uhlig† paper
Technology 21.35 15.16
Price Markup 8.58 6.05
Wage Markup 9.17 0.56
Lab. Tax 8.26 4.30
Gov. Spending 3.39 2.72
Priv. Inv. 18.77 12.88
Gov. Inv. 4.75 5.81
Policy Rate 18.77 18.30
5 y. Gov. Bonds 22.27
10 y. Gov. Bonds 6.36
20 y. Gov. Bonds 2.58
20 y. Priv. Bonds 1.20 1.55
Pref. Shock 7.83
We are using the posterior modes in Table 2 for these calculations.
the 5-year bond associated with government borrowing—ωf in Figure 1(b)—assumes a much
greater role, accounting for 22.27% of the fluctuations in output for the entire sample.
Table 1 shows that the variance decomposition of the two models assigns nearly identical
values to monetary policy, between 18% and 19% of the total variation in output.
While the patterns of output decomposition across the two models are broadly similar, there
are, however, important differences. Particularly noticeable is the asymmetric distribution (far
more positive than negative) of shocks in Figure 10, implying that in the original model output
is nearly always well above the value associated with balanced growth. By contrast, in our
model presented in Figure 2, the initial conditions in 1948 imply output is below the values
associated with balanced growth, but then output fluctuates closer to and more often below
the horizontal axis across the enlarged sample, implying that the model is perhaps producing
a somewhat more intuitive measure of trend growth.
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Figure 10: Shock decomposition 1948Q2–2008Q4, DU model (with corrected code), calculated
using the decomposition formula (6).
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